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further provided that upon motion made within one year following
a removal from the calendar, an action
which has been removed
219
may be replaced at the foot thereof.
The court's conclusion that it may replace the action only
at the foot of the calendar under the present rules may be seen
more clearly by reference to the prior rules. The rules effective
in 1958 (but now superseded) state that if a motion to restore
the action to the calendar is granted, "the action must be placed
at the foot of the general trial calendar; provided, however, that
for good cause shown . . . the justice presiding in his discretion

may order the action placed in any other appropriate calendar
position." 220 The last clause, allowing judicial discretion to determine the calendar position upon restoration, is not contained
in the present rules.
The court further reasoned that even though both parties consented, a restoration would defeat
the purpose of the rule, which
22
is to penalize a dilatory party.
The practitioner's attention is called to ihe fact that if he
fails to have the action restored within one year of its removal,
the action "shall be dismissed . . . for neglect to prosecute." 222
In conclusion, if the practitioner requires longer than the
one year to file his statement of readiness, he may obtain an
extension, upon motion to the court,223 which will be granted if good

cause is shown.
ARTIcLE

41-

TRIAL BY A JURY

"Quotient verdict" illegal; "averaging" legal.
The New York City Civil Court in denying defendant's motion to set aside a jury's verdict, explained in detail the methods
by which a jury may arrive at its verdict. 224 The defendant in
this case based his motion on statements made by the jury foreman when he announced the verdict. When questioned as to the
jury's decision the foreman stated, "it [the verdict] was decided
upon by the Jury, an average method.. ." Thereafter the jury
was polled and found to be unanimous in its decision. After being
polled, the foreman, in answer to a question by the defendant's
attorney, stated that "the amount of money was arrived at by
averaging."
N.Y. App. Div. R. VIII, pt. 7 (2d Dep't 1964).
21-17 (1958 ed.).
221Supra note 218.
222 CPLR 3404. The statute of limitations consequences of a dismissal
for neglect to prosecute should be borne in mind here. See CPLR 205.
223 Supra note 219.
224 Honigsberg v. New York City Transit Authority, 43 Misc. 2d 1,
249 N.Y.S.2d 296 (Civ. Ct. 1964).
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BIANNUAL 'SURVEY

With the above statements as defendant's evidence, the court
proceeded to define the different types of verdicts. The most
common of the illegal verdicts is the "compromise verdict." This is
a verdict arrived at when a juror surrenders a conscientious conviction on one material issue in return for the relinquishment by
another juror of his conscientious conviction on another issue.
The court was quick to point out that jurors may give weight
to the opinions of other jurors and reasonable concessions may be
made. Thus, to set aside a verdict as being one of compromise,
it must appear that a conscientious conviction was sacrificed. The
compromise verdict may be detected by the fact that a given
verdict cannot be found consistent with any version of the
proof.
The decision then proceeded to distinguish the "quotient
verdict," which is illegal, from a legal verdict arrived at by
averaging. The "quotient verdict" results from an agreement pursuant to which each juror writes down the amount of damages
he would award and the twelve figures are averaged to arrive
at the amount of damages. The fact that each juror discloses his
own figure as to damages does not in and of itself make the
verdict illegal. The essential element of the illegality of the
"quotient verdict" is the prior agreement to be bound by the
225
result of the computation.

Having defined these concepts, the court held that the verdict
here was not shown to have been arrived at by an illegal method.
The presumption is that no illegal arrangements were made and
therefore the party attempting to overturn a verdict must affirmatively show that it was arrived at by improper means.2 26 Herein
lies the difficulty for the practitioner. How does one sustain the
burden of proof in this instance? "It is well settled that a juror
Therefore,
is not competent to impeach his verdict . .. -227
proof must be given by someone other than a juror. The court,
sustaining the verdict at bar, did not have occasion to investigate
the difficult questions of proof invariably attendant upon overturning
a verdict on the basis of something that occurred in the jury
room.
ARTICLE 52-

ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

Contempt of court for disobedience of article 52 subpoena.
In James v. Powell 228 an interesting contention was made by

the contemnor's attorney.
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Defendant-contemnor is a rather re-

Id.at 5, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
Id. at 6, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 303.

PRiNc, RICHARDSON ON EViDEICE § 423 (9th ed. 1964).
Misc. 2d 314, 250 N.Y.S.2d 635 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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